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1Abstract:
We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology
(i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its
emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.
JEL classi￿cations: Q55
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1 Introduction
We analyze a scenario ￿ la Dockner and Long (1993), where two identical countries emit
pollutants which accumulate into a stock of pollution over time. Both countries su⁄er
a damage to social welfare from this transboundary stock of pollution. We consider the
case where countries set their emissions policies non-cooperatively, and show that the
impact of implementing a cleaner technology in the production process on social welfare
is ambiguous.
Consider two technologies, one "clean" and one "dirty", and consider the non-cooperative
emission strategies under a "dirty" technology that we refer to as the "dirty" equilibrium.
Now suppose a cleaner technology is implemented. Clearly the non-cooperative equilib-
rium strategies under the "dirty" technology are still feasible. However, is this pro￿le of
emission strategies still a Nash equilibrium? The answer is no. The adoption of a "clean"
technology reduces each country￿ s damage from pollution along the "dirty" equilibrium
and, therefore, gives an incentive to each country to produce more than it would under
the "dirty" technology. The negative environmental impact of the increase in production
2of both countries can outweigh the positive environmental impact of adopting a "clean"
technology. The bene￿t of the extra consumption from the adoption of the "clean" tech-
nology can be outweighed by the loss in welfare due to the increase in pollution. The
positive shock of implementing a cleaner technology results in a more "aggressive" and
"sel￿sh" behavior of countries that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to the presence
of the pollution externality. This phenomenon is similar to the "voracity e⁄ect" high-
lighted, in a di⁄erent context, in Tornell and Lane (1999), Tornell and Velasco (1992)
and Long and Sorger (2006). These papers consider a model of economic growth where
multiple powerful interest groups within the economy have open access, via a process of
￿scal redistribution, to a common capital stock. They consider a two sector economy
with a formal sector where the return on capital is taxable and an informal sector which
is nontaxable but yields a lower return. It is shown that if there do not exist institutional
barriers to discretionary redistribution, an increase in the raw rate of return of capital
reduces growth. This is because the increase in the rate of return of capital in the for-
mal sector induces the "voracity e⁄ect" by which each interest group attempts to grab
a greater share of national wealth by demanding more transfers. This e⁄ect is shown
to dominate any direct e⁄ect of the positive shock resulting in a negative relationship
between the rate of return of capital and growth.
We present the transboundary pollution game model in section 2 and derive a Markov-
perfect Nash equilibrium in section 3. In section 4, we determine the impact of the
adoption of a cleaner technology. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
32 The Model
Consider two countries indexed by i = 1;2: Each country produces a single consumption
good, Qi; with a given ￿xed endowment of factors of production and a given technology.
The production of a unit of the consumption good results in the emission of Ei units of
pollution where
Ei = ￿Qi: (1)
The parameter ￿ represents the ratio of emissions to output. The development of
"cleaner" technologies is re￿ ected by a fall in ￿; that is, less emissions generated per
unit of output.
The amount of pollution accumulates into a stock, P (t); over time, according to the
following transition equation
_ P (t) = E1 (t) + E2 (t) ￿ kP (t); k > 0; (2)
with the initial stock
P (0) = P0 (3)
In (2); k represents the rate of natural puri￿cation, that is, the rate at which the stock
of pollution naturally decays.
For notational convenience, the argument of time, t; is in general omitted throughout
the paper although it is understood that all variables may be time dependent.
The instantaneous bene￿t in country i from consuming a quantity Qi of the consump-
tion good is given by





i; A > 0 with i = 1;2





2; s > 0 with i = 1;2.
The instantaneous net bene￿ts of country i are thus given by
Bi (Qi;P) = Ui (Qi) ￿ Ci (P) (4)
Using (1), it follows that the objective of country i￿ s government is to choose a pollution
control strategy Ei (t) (or equivalently an output strategy) that maximizes the discounted













￿ Ci (P (t))
￿
dt (5)
subject to the accumulation equation (2) and the initial condition (3). The discount rate,
r; is assumed to be constant and identical for both countries. We give below a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of this two-player di⁄erential game.
3 The Markov perfect equilibrium
Firms use Markovian strategies where they condition the level of emissions at a given
moment, t; on t and on the current-state variable, P (t); that summarizes the latest
available information of the dynamic system. The pair (￿1;￿2) is a Markov Perfect
Nash equilibrium, MPNE, if for each i 2 f1;2g, given that Ej (t) = ￿j (P (t);t) with
j 2 f1;2g;j 6= i, an optimal control path, Ei (:); of the problem (5) exists and is given
by the Markovian strategy ￿i: Ei (t) = ￿i (P (t);t).
It is well known that such a game admits a unique linear equilibrium and a continuum
of equilibria with non-linear strategies (see Dockner and Long (1993) and Rubio and
5Casino (2002)). The linear equilibrium is globally de￿ned and, therefore, quali￿es as
a Markov perfect equilibrium. The non-linear equilibria are typically locally de￿ned,
i.e. over a subset of the state space. We focus in this analysis on the linear strategies
equilibrium. Since our contribution is to highlight an a priori unexpected outcome from
the adoption of a "cleaner" technology we wish to make sure that our result is not driven
by the fact that countries are using highly "sophisticated" strategies.
Proposition 1: The pair
￿i (P) = ￿A + ￿
2 (￿￿P ￿ ￿), i = 1;2 (6)
constitutes a Markov perfect linear equilibrium and discounted net welfare is given by




2 ￿ ￿P ￿ ￿, i = 1;2 (7)
where
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￿ > 0 (8)
is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the undetermined coe¢ cient technique (see Dockner et al (2000) Chap-
ter 4) to derive the linear Markov perfect equilibrium. The details are omitted. (See
Proposition 1 of Dockner and Long (1993) for the case where ￿ = 1)￿
6We note that Ei > 0 (and therefore, Qi > 0) i⁄ P < ￿ P (￿) ￿ 1
￿￿ (A ￿ ￿￿): It is
straightforward to show that ￿ P (￿) > PSS (￿) for all ￿:
4 Impact of cleaner technology
The development of a cleaner technology is captured by a decrease in the emissions to
output ratio, ￿. We show that implementing a cleaner technology may end up reducing
social welfare, (7); in each country: Wi (P) may be an increasing function of ￿. Hence-
forth, for notational convenience, we explicitly write welfare as a function of ￿ as well
as P : Wi (P;￿). We note that Wi (P;￿) is homogenous of degree zero in (r;k) for all P:
Therefore, we can normalize one of these parameters without loss of generality: we set
k = 1: For simplicity, unless otherwise mentioned, we set A = 100 and r = 1. It can be
shown that our main conclusions remain robust to changes in the values of A and r:
The steady state equilibrium pollution stock is then given by














Proposition 2: There exists ￿ ￿ ’ 1:26 p




A decrease in the emissions to output ratio results in a larger stock of pollution at the
steady state.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Following the adoption of a cleaner technology each country increases its production
and the resulting increase in emissions outweighs the positive shock of a decrease in the
7emissions to output ratio.
The impact of a decrease of ￿ on social welfare Wi (P;￿) depends on the level of
pollution P at the moment the change in ￿ occurs. To economize on space we shall focus
on one particular value of P which is PSS.1 More precisely, suppose that the emissions
to output ratio drops from ￿0 to ￿ < ￿0 then from (9), we obtain PSS (￿0) and PSS (￿);
that is, the steady state pollution stocks when the emissions to output ratio are given
by ￿0 and ￿ respectively. We shall compare Wi (PSS (￿0);￿0) to Wi (PSS (￿0);￿). Note
that our analysis, is, thus, not a simple analysis of steady states levels of welfare, we take
into account the impact on welfare during the transition from PSS (￿0) to the new steady
state pollution stock PSS (￿).
Given the cumbersome expression of Wi (PSS (￿0);￿); we illustrate our main ￿nding
with the analysis of a marginal reduction in ￿, i.e. in the neighborhood of ￿0. We provide





as a function of ￿0. From Figure 1, we can state





> 0 for all ￿ > ￿ ￿0 : that is, a
decrease in ￿; the emissions to output ratio, reduces social welfare.












We also consider a non-marginal reduction in ￿: we set ￿0 = 5 and plot, in Figure 2,
Wi (PSS (5);￿). Figure 2 shows that the value of ￿ should decrease to levels smaller than
2:7 (a decrease by more than 46%) before the reduction in the emissions to output ratio
results in an increase in welfare.2
S
Wi(PSS(S0=5), S)
Figure 2: The effect of non-marginal changes in S on welfare





2We note that maxfPSS (5),PSS (2:7)g < minf ￿ P
￿ ￿
￿=5 ; ￿ P
￿ ￿
￿=2:7g.
9In Figures 1 and 2, we set s = 1: It can be shown that our main conclusions remain
qualitatively robust to changes in s:
The non-cooperative equilibrium strategies under the "dirty" technology are feasi-
ble under the "clean" technology. However, this pro￿le of emission strategies is not a
Nash equilibrium. The adoption of a "clean" technology reduces each country￿ s damage
from pollution along the "dirty" equilibrium, thereby giving each country an incentive
to produce more than it would produce under the "dirty" technology. The negative en-
vironmental impact of the increase in the production of both countries can outweigh the
positive environmental impact of adopting a "clean" technology. The positive shock of
a cleaner technology results in a more "aggressive" and "sel￿sh" behavior of countries
that exacerbates the e¢ ciency loss due to the presence of the pollution externality. This
phenomenon is similar to the "voracity e⁄ect" highlighted in Tornell and Lane (1999),
Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Long and Sorger (2006).
5 Concluding remarks
An alternative that has been proposed to the Kyoto agreement (which is currently rid-
dled with free-riding issues) is a set of treaties: one promoting cooperative R&D and
the other encouraging the collective adoption of new cleaner technologies arising from
this R&D. For example, Barrett (2006) sets up a model in which if all countries adopt
the "breakthrough" technology, this leads to a discrete drop in emissions, leaving the
countries collectively better o⁄. In this paper, we developed a model where the adoption
of a cleaner technology may leave all countries worse o⁄.
We analyzed a scenario where two identical countries emit pollutants which accumu-
10late into a stock of pollution over time. Both countries su⁄er a damage to social welfare
from this stock of pollution. Within this context, we showed that the implementation of
a cleaner technology in the production process can have an ambiguous e⁄ect on welfare
if the countries behave non-cooperatively. If the countries were to cooperatively set their
individual emission levels to maximize joint welfare, then welfare would unambiguously
increase in response to the implementation of cleaner technologies. However, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, each country￿ s response to the cleaner technology is to increase
its own output without internalizing the negative impact of the resultant increase in the
stock of pollution on the other country￿ s welfare. We identi￿ed the range of emission to
output ratio for which this causes welfare in each country to fall as cleaner technologies
are implemented.
There seems to be a general consensus amongst governments, international organi-
zations and academics that a signi￿cant e⁄ort in the creation of clean technologies is
needed. The main implication of our ￿nding, however, is that the need for international
cooperation to overcome the ine¢ ciency due to the presence of transboundary negative
externalities does not necessarily diminish with the development of cleaner technologies.































2 + 3 (11)
Note that s￿
2 = X￿3






























































































@X2 jX=3 = ￿0:64952 < 0 for all X > 3: Thus
Z (X) is continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly concave in X for all X > 3 with Z (3) =
20:79 > 0 and limX!1Z (X) = ￿1: Therefore, Z (X) has one and only one root over
X 2 [3;1), given by ￿ X ’ 9:38; and we have
@F(￿)
@￿ < 0 for all s￿
2 >
￿ X￿3
4 ’ 1:59 or
￿ > ￿ ￿ ’ 1:26 p
s . ￿
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